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SIMULAnON OF EVENillG OF llURUllG UTIODU<ZD AS 
•EVIDENCE TO THE CORTRARY• 
R. v. Hughes 5 W.W.R. (1982] 673 Alberta Court of Appeal 
A demand for samples of breath was made of the accused and the lowest 
of the analyses showed 15 milligrams. 
Eighteen months later (in preparation for his jury trial for "over 80 
milligrams") the accused and a former R.C.M.P. officer, now in private 
security, simulated the entire day of the alleged offence. The ex-
officer (a qualified technician with his own breathalyzer) supervised 
the accused's drinking and took the tests at exactly the same time and 
after as much drinking as on that day. The lowest reading was 30 
milligrams. This, the accused claimed, "was evidence to the contrary" 
that the readings on the night of the alleged offence were inaccur-
ate. The Judge instructed the Jury that this was not so and the 
accused was convicted. The accused appealed this conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal. 
The quantities and the times of the accused's consumption of alcoholic 
beverages on the date of the offence was given by the accused and a 
friend who had been keeping him company that night. The reason for 
rejecting that evidence and the testimony of the ex-officer was 
because it relied entirely on evidence of the accused and as "we don't 
know what condition might have varied in between the two dates in 
question". 
The Court of Appeal held that in other cases evidence of witnesses in 
regards to drinking and expert testimony has been capable of being 
"evidence to the contrary". Whether or not it was capable of being 
such evidence was for the Judge to decide; whether or not it was, 
was for the Jury to consider. When the Judge instructed the Jury that 
the evidence was incapable of being evidence to the contrary, he was 
wrong. Consequently, the Jury never got to decide if there was a 
reasonable doubt 
New Trial Ordered 
* * * * * 
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WR.ORC DIAGNOSIS - FR.AUD 
Detering v. The queen Supreme Court of Canada November 1982 
A lady investigator with the Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Commer-
cial Relations had the transmission of a car slightly tampered with 
and took it to the. accused who manages an engine and transmission ."re-
building" shop. The accused test drove the car, examined it and said 
that the transmission required an overhaul. The car was picked up 
some time later and the investigator paid a bill for a complete trans-
mission rebuild. 
The repair required was a minor adjustment only. The transmission was 
examined by mechanics and it was found that the repairs paid for were 
not done. 
The accused was convicted of fraud. The Ontario Court of Appeal held 
that the investigator (in view of her previous knowledge of the 
transmission's condition) was never deceived. The accused had only 
tried to deceive her. The Court of Appeal substituted, therefore, a 
conviction of attempted fraud. The accused appealed the conviction to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Defence counsel raised an interesting argument. He submitted that to 
show fraud as in this case there must be a "concurrence" between the 
representation and the intent to commit fraud. In other words, the 
Crown must show · that when the accused told the investigator that the 
transmission needed to be rebuilt, he knew that this was not true, 
intended to make the minor adjustment only and charge for the over-
haul. 
If the accused really believed that the transmission needed the major 
repair and found, when he did the work, that this was not so, but 
still charged for repair not carried out, then his action does not 
amount to attempted fraud. Defence counsel argued that to attempt an 
offence (s. 24 C.C.) one must intend to comm.it the full offence. When 
the accused made his diagnosis, the lady was not deceived. Deception 
is an essential ingredient to fraud. Hence no conviction of fraud or 
attempt fraud was proper. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's actions were 
carried beyond mere intention. They amounted to "a reaffirmation" or 
a continuation of what the accused really intended. He did not attain 
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that goal and, therefore, his actions amounted to an attempt,to commit 
the fraud. 
Conviction upheld. 
In the County Court of Vancouver a party by the name of Viznei* was 
tried for attempted fraud. He was attempting to peddle two paintings 
by Picasso and Turner misrepresenting the original ownership and value 
of the paintings. The prospective purchaser became suspicious and 
called police. A Police officer played the role of a wealthy 
businessman who was looking to invest ''black" money to escape paying 
taxes. 
The officer was also aware of the misrepresentations the accused made 
and was not deceived by them. However, this was not raised by the 
defence or observed by the Court. The accused was convicted on both 
counts of attempt fraud. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Visnei No. CC821024 Vancouver Registry 
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DELIBERATE ARD PLAIOOm MURDD. 
R. v. Ruptash 68 c.c.c. (2d) 182 
Alberta Court of Appeal May 1982 
Ruptash was convicted of murder in the first degree. The victim, a 
woman, was found to have been strangled from behind with what was 
believed to be an electrical cord. The evidence revealed that the 
perpetrator had taken a lot of pain to cover up traces of evidence. 
The medical testimony proved that strangulation must be applied for 
four to five minutes to cause death. This, the trial judge said, 
disqualified the act from being impulsive or on the spur of the 
moment. Therefore, it was planned and murder in the first degree. 
The Alberta Court of Appeal which reconsidered the conviction, reiter-
ated that the deliberation requisite for a murder to be one in the 
first degree, "must occur before the act of murder commences". 
There had been no evidence adduced which showed or from which it even 
could be inferred that the murderer had intentions or a plan to kill 
prior to his arrival; neither was there any evidence of what occurred 
while he was at the victim's home. Said the Court of Appeal: "One 
cannot say that every killer who takes a weapon in hand has delibera-
ted on a plan, especially where a weapon is at the ready". This meant 
that the conviction of murder in the first degree could not stand. 
In addition, the accused had appealed claiming that "he was not the· 
culprit". However, the Court of Appeal held that if all evidence 
adduced at trial was believed, it is capable of leading to a verdict 
of guilty. 
New trial for murder in the second degree 
ordered. 
* * * * * 
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VOLUMTAllNESS OF A STATEKEMT 
Hobbins v. The Queen 66 C.C.C. (2d) 289 
Supreme Court of Canada 
The accused, a 16 year old youth with a 
ioned in regards to arson on November 24. 
questioned again by the same officers who 
ered more information. 
criminal record, was quest-
on January the 18th he was 
in the meantime had discov-
In both incidents, the accused had been unwilling to accompany police 
but had little choice as he was already in jail serving a sentence for 
another and unrelated offence. The statements the accused made were 
referred to by the Court as confessions. In any event, both state-
ments must have been important to the Crown's case as both were 
adduced in evidence at the accused's trial by a judge and jury. The 
trial Court Judge had not allowed the first statement in evidence as 
he was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was given vol-
untarily. The second statement was admitted, and the accused was 
convicted. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
and turned to the Supreme Court of Canada to have his plight consid-
ered. 
The reason for the trial judge disallowing the first statement in evi-
dence was due to the "oppressive treatment of the accused or police 
conduct which had effect upon him". This, the defence claimed, 
tainted the second statement. If the accused was treated in such a 
manner when questioned in November, that it caused him to fear the 
officers or police in general, then he can be expected to have had as 
much fear when he was interviewed by the same officers in January. 
The Supreme Court of Canada said that there is no doubt that the state 
of mind of the accused is important and relevant to the admissibility 
of a statement*. However, fear on the part of the accused or appre-
hension when interviewed by police will not prevent a statement from 
being admitted in evidence. Said the Court: 
"An atmosphere of oppression may be created 
in the circumstances surrounding the taking 
of a statement, although there be no induce-
aent held out of hope of advantage or fear 
of prejudice and absent any threats of viol-
ence or actual violence. However, • • .an 
ac~used's own timidity or subjective fear of 
the police will not avail to avoid the 
* Horvath v. The Queen (1979) 44 c.c.c. (2d) 385 (page 22 of Volume 7 
of this publication. 
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admissibility of a statement or confession 
unless there are external circumstances 
brought about by the conduct of the police 
that can be said to cast doubt on the volun-
tariness of a statement ••• " 
In addition to this, there may, of course, be circumstances that may 
af feet the accused which are capable of creating doubt that a state-
ment was voluntarily given. These are often not caused by any ille-
galities committed by polic but possibly relate to other circum-
stances, eg., time, place or length of interrogation. 
Dealing with the common law presumption that the circumstances sur-
rounding an interview which render a statement inadmissible may 
similarly taint a statement made during a subsequent interview, the 
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously decided: 
"Certainly, here there was a considerable 
time lag, enough to dissipate any lingering 
effect of the first statement • • • There 
was no advertence to the first statement 
when the second one was taken". 
Accused's Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CIIMlllAL LIABD.ITIES - CATAGOIUES OF OFFENCE 
DRIVING VHILE ll>HESTLY BELIEVING 10UR lllIVER.'S 
LICENCE IS llOT SUSPENDED 
The Queen v. MacDougall - Supreme Court of Canada, November 23, 1982 
The accused was acquitted of driving while his driver's licence was 
cancelled. The offence is one created under the Nova Scotia Motor 
Vehicle Act. The Crown took the case via the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The issue was whether the accused's claimed lack of knowledge of the 
cancellation rendered him innocent while driving during the period of 
cance lla ti on. 
The circumstances are interesting and as follows: 
March 6, 1979 
April 10, 1979 
the accused was convicted of "fail in duty at scene 
of accident" under the Criminal Code; 
the accused was sent an order of revocation of 
licence by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles; 
The accused appealed his conviction; 
May 1, 1979 
Dec. 21, 1979 
a notice of re-instatement of driving privilege 
pending the outcome of the appeal was sent to the 
accused; 
the appeal was dismissed; 
Sometime in January 1980 the accused was informed by his lawyer of the 
appeal results; 
Jan. 25, 1980 the accused drove to his work and was stopped by 
police; when arriving home that evening, "Notice of 
Revocation of Licence" by the Registrar had arrived 
in the mail. 
The Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act is similar to legislation in other 
provinces. It compels "the Registrar of Motor Vehicles" to revoke the 
licence of a person convicted of Hit and Run. The Act also provides 
that if a person appeals the conviction "he shall be deemed not to be 
convicted" for the purpose of the revocation of licence provisions. 
However, if the appeal is dismissed, "the driver's licence shall be 
thereupon and t~ereby revoked and remain revoked". 
For all intents and purposes then, the accused's licence was cancelled 
again upon the dismissal of his appeal on December 21, 1979. It was 
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proved tha~ the accused had, when stopped, knowledge that his appeal was 
dismissed. However, he claimed to be ignorant of the provision that his 
licenc was automatically revoked when his appeal was disissed. He was 
under the impression that he would receive a revocation order and that 
his licence was valid until then. When he drove and was stopped he had 
not received the notice yet. Did the honest impressions the accused had 
in regards to the status of his licence give him a defence? In other 
words, does "mistake of fact" on the part of the accused render him 
innocent? Were the misconceptions not a mistake of law rather than a 
mistake of fact? 
There are basically three different categories of offences. If some-
thing provides a defence for an of fence in one category, it does not 
necessarily follow that that is also a defence for offence in the other 
categories. 
In offences of a true criminal nature, the Crown is obliged to prove 
mens rea. This consists of a positive state of mind, "stich as intent 
knowledge or recklessness". Then there is the category known as "strict 
liability offences". Most provincially created offences belong to this 
category. Once the Crown has proved that the prohibited act was commit-
ted, the accused is liable. If the defence can show that every reason-
able care was taken, liability may be avoided. 
"This involves what a reasonable man would have done 
in the circumstances. The defence is available if the 
accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts 
which, if true, would render the act or omission 
innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid 
the particular event". 
The third category is offences of absolute liability. These are usually 
offences involving provisions, regulations and imposed duties which 
affect, for instance, health, safety and general public welfare which 
the legal system simply cannot afford to forgive a person for because he 
is free of fault. Sometimes proof that the event took place, coupled 
with statutory provisions that the accused is liable is sufficient. The 
offence can even be committed without a wrongful act Cactus reus) on the 
part of the accused*. ~~ 
* R. v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd. (1970) 5 c.c.c. 193 is a perfect example 
of this liability. The accused had 60,000 pounds of lobster delivered 
to his plant. Inspectors arrived and found 26 lobsters to be under-
size. The accused had no intent and no one in the plant knew of the 
undersized fish. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada held that driving while suspended or while 
· one's licence is cancelled is an offence of strict liability. In view 
of the clear and unambiguous provision in the N.S. Motor Vehicle Act, 
the accused's misconceptions were mistakes of law and not a mistake of 
fact. Ignorance of the law is no excuse and "the failure to appreciate 
the legal duty imposed by that law (that the licence was revoked when 
the appeal was dismissed) is of no solace to the appellant". 
Crown's appeal allowed and new trial ordered. 
* * * * * 
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CllAllTEll OF ltIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Can one Person Separately Charged with the Same Offence 
as the Accused (Arising from the Same Circumstances) be 
Compelled to Testify at the Accused's Trial? 
Chase and B. C. Attorney General Supreme Court of B. C. - Vancouver, 
September 1982 No. A822615. 
Section 11 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms assures the Right that 
someone charged with an offence not be "compelled to be a witness in 
proceedings against that person in respect of the offence". 
Section 13 of the Charter guarantees that incriminating testimony cannot 
be used to incriminate the witness in any other subsequent proceedings 
except for perjury and giving contradictory evidence. 
The Crown has taken the position that these sections constitutionalized 
the law as it was before the Charter became effective. The exception is 
that now a witness no longer has to ask the court for protection as he 
had to previously under the Canada Evidence Act. Now the protection is 
automatic. In other words, "there is nothing new under the legal sun". 
It was also feared that the Charter would cause some legal "side 
tracking". Interruptions of trials were predicted so applications for 
remedies respecting every conceivable issue in the Charter could be 
taken to the superior courts. Although the system in the U. S. is 
different from ours, a somewhat similar "side tracking" process is a 
legal means to procrastinate and frustrate the legal system. To exercise 
the ultimate rights and freedoms the democratic system and the constitu-
tion provides. It was also feared that on account of the Charter, we 
would adopt "the pre-trial motions of exclusion procedures of the U. s. 
However, our Courts seem to prevent this. In several cases it was held 
that the extra ordinary remedies do not apply. If a Charter issue is to 
be decided, the trial Courts, having jurisdiction over the offence, are 
competent to rule on these issues. The party who feels that the ruling 
contributed to a verdict adverse to him, can appeal and raise the 
Charter isaue again. This at least seems the trend of the judgments of 
our superior Courts. 
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' In his case the Crown proceeded against three persons with arson and 
.. wilful damage in respect to a building fire. One party (A) was charged 
~ :aeparately and B (Mr. Chase) and C jointly. When A was to be tried B 
was subpoened by the Crown. As the law was, prior to the Charter, this 
could be done. However, B immediately petitioned the Supreme Court to, 
in essence, quash the subpoena. B claimed that by virtue of sections 11 
and 13 of the Charter she was not compellable to testify at A's trial. 
Being charged herself with identical offences arising from the same 
circumstances, would mean that she would be compelled to incriminate 
herself. 
The Supreme Court Justice declined to intervene. The Court commented 
that the issue was one in respect to the admissibility of evidence in 
which the trial courts have jurisdiction. He said that B should raise 
her objections during the trial. It is up to the trial Judge to deter-
mine if B's evidence is receivable at A's trial, held the Court and 
included in the reasons for judgment: 
"If it was otherwise there would be interminable and 
intollerable delays in the trial process in those 
courts subject to the supervision of superior courts". 
AMEN! 
* * * * * 
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URLAWFUL POSSESSION OP MUSHROOMS 
The queen v. Dunn, Supreme Court of Canada, November 23, 1982 
Mushrooms containing psilocybin in their natural form, have become a 
problem from legal and other viewpoints. For instance, is the owner of 
land (who knows that such mushrooms grow on his land) guilty of an 
offence under the Food and Drugs Act which prohibits possession of 
psilocybin? Should perhaps possession of a natural plant (the integral 
part of which contains an illegal drug) whether harvested or not, be 
excluded from the offence of possessing a restricted drug? 
Parliament did not name the mushroom but only the drug (psilocybin) in 
its prohibiting legislation; should therefore a person only be punish-
able when he is in possession of the extracted drug only? The B. C. 
Court of Appeal and its Alberta counterpart found in 19791 and 19802 
respectively, that "mere possession of the substance known as psilocy-
bin, as an integral part of the plant in which it is found in nature, 
cannot support a conviction for possession of a restricted drug • • • ". 
Because of these precedents the accused Dunn was acquitted of a charge 
that he did traffic in psilocybin by selling the mushrooms which con-
tained the drug in their natural state. The Crown took the case to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
The defence argued that if Parliament had intended to create an of fence 
for possession of the plant (mushroom) as well as the drug, it would 
have enacted provisions similar to those in the Narcotic Control Act 
where possession of certain plants as well as the substance they contain 
is prohibited. 
The Supreme Court of Canada however, concluded: 
". • • that the actual compound known as Psilocybin, 
not merely the constituent elements from which it 
could be chemically produced, exists in the mushrooms, 
and that its hallucinogenic effects may be obtained by 
chewing or eating the mushrooms". 
This left the Court to decide if "Psilocybin, naturally occurring in a 
mushroom is listed in Schedule H ••• " and if the accused, by selling the 
mushrooms . .. did traffic in that drug • 
.i 
1 R. v. Parnell (1979) 51 CCC (2d) 413 
2 R. v. Cartier (1980) 54 CCC (2d) 32 
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"The accused had agreed to sell to an undercover officer one . pound of 
aushrooms that contained psilocybin. The conversation between the 
constable and the accused as well as the $3,000 price tag ehowed that 
,.the psilocybin was the object of the sale and the 11Ushrooms were merely 
incidental to it. The Constable, while examining the mushrooms, said: 
"So this is the Psilocybin shit, eh. The accused had replied, "Yeah, 
that's the stuff. Why don't you try a chew". 
This and the accused's assessment of his merchandise (he told the under-
cover officer that it was "good stuff") excluded the possibility that 
the mushrooms were sold for food value, "and any other conclusion is 
impossible". 
The Court said on the issue whether the mushrooms as a plant are a 
restricted drug under Schedule H. 
" ••• the fact that psilocybin may be contained within 
a mushroom does not destroy its character as a res-
tricted drug under Schedule H of the Food and Drugs 
Act" 
The Supreme Court of Canada said that with the greatest respect for the 
learned judges of the Courts of Appeal, that they wrongly decided the 
cases on this issue. The farmer who may unknowingly have such mushrooms 
on his land is in mere physical possession of the drug but not in unlaw-
ful possession . as is stipulated in the Act. 
• reason and connnon sense on the part of the 
authorities would protect him if on discovery of the 
nature of the mushrooms he took the necessary steps to 
have them destroyed". 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Case referred back to the trial court for 
completion. 
* * * * * 
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POSSBSSIOll ~ A WKAPOll DANGEROUS TO 1BE PUBLIC PEACE 
SELP PllOTECfiOll 
Sulland v. The Queen B. C. Court of Appeal CA820276 November 1982 
The accused was seen walking alone in an area "in which trouble could be 
anticipated". The accused was seen to carry something under his jacket 
and police stopped hm. As it turned out the item was a part can of 
beer. However, the accused also wore a large jack-knife (3.5" blade) in 
a sheath and when questioned about this, he said he carried it "For 
protection. To use if I get jumped on or someone comes on to me". 
When tried for possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace, the 
trial judge concluded that although the accused showed he also used the 
knife for useful purposes, it was improper in our present society for a 
person to arm themselves to walk the streets. 
The accused appealed his conviction claiming that the trial judge erred 
when he equated self protection with a purpose dangerous to the public 
peace. 
In Ontario* a man carried a concealed knife with an 18 inch blade into a 
bar. In a confrontation which he had anticipated, he injured sev.eral 
persons. The Ontario Court of Appeal said that "not withstanding" the 
accused's explanation of self defence, a person who possesses a weapon 
for such a purpose can still do so endangering the public peace. The 
circumstances, including the nature of the weapon, the situation in 
which the accused has it in his possession, his explanation, and the use 
to which he actually puts it, will determine whether the object carried 
was for a purpose dangerous to the public peace. 
The questions in this Sulland case are whether the knife was a weapon 
and if carried for purposes and in circumstances as described, it was 
dangerous to the public peace. 
Firstly, the Court held that the knife was not designed to be a weapon, 
therefore only the accused's intent could make it such (section 2 
Criminal Code). The Court concluded that section 85 C.C. (possession of 
a weapon dangerous to the public peace) does not prohibit a person from 
arming himself for self protection. The B. c. Court . of Appeal reasoned 
that as long as a person's conduct does not provoke an attack, carrying 
something in a lawful manner for the purpose of self-defence, with the 
intent to use it responsibly, is not an offence. Although the Court 
recognized that it may well be unwise to prepare to defend oneself and 
• 
* R. v. Nelson 
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that the presence of a weapon is likely to result in greater injury, the 
Justices said: 
"In the secure surroundings of a court house we might 
think it better that people be beaten or raped than 
that they, or their assailant, be injured with a 
weapon. But those who must walk unsafe streets and 
who are not robust might feel quite differently. They 
might not be prepared to accept a beating. Some might 
choose to defend themselves. A woman might have a hat 
pin and no hat. ls she, without more, guilty of this 
crime? Surely not". 
The accused walked alone in an area where trouble may be expected. The 
knife was closed, in a case and unconcealed. Besides the tool it was to 
him, he said not to hesitate to use it if attacked. That does not con-
stitute the offence of carrying a weapon dangerous to the public peace 
and made this case distinct from the Ontario case). 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction set aside and acquittal entered. 
* * * * * 
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llIGRT OF POLICE OFFICEl.S m BB IEPRESERTED 
BY COUNSEL AT DISCIPLINARY llEAIUNGS 
Between the petitioner Constable J and the respondents, the Vancouver 
Chief Constable and the Attorney General of B. C. 
The Supreme Court of B. c., November 1982, No. A822132 Vancouver 
Registry 
Constable J allegedly ordered a citizen to "get in the ••• car". The 
omitted adjective was not complimentary to the car nor was it considered 
courteous or civil by the recipient of the constable's order. The citi-
zen lodged a formal complaint against the constable, a 13 year veteran 
with an "unblemished" record and reputation. 
The mandatory investigation resulted in the Chief's delegate completing 
a Form 3 alleging that Constable J committed a disciplinary default, to 
wit, "Abuse of Authority" contrary to section 7(c) of the Police Discip-
linary Code under the Regulations to the Police Act*. 
The maximum penalty recommended by the investigating officer was an 
eight hour (one day) suspension without pay. The Disciplinary Code 
stipulates that a police officer is only entitled to be represented by a 
member of the Law Society at a disciplinary hearing if the maximum 
penalty recommended is dismissal, resignation or a reduction in rank; 
In spite of this, Constable J appeared before the hearing officer accom-
panied by a lawyer. The constable was not allowed the representation. 
The hearing was then adjourned so Constable J could petition the B. C. 
Supreme Court on this issue. 
Counsel for Constable J. contended that the new Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms renders the Disciplinary Regulation that deprived her client of 
his right to counsel, ultra vires the Lieutenant Governor in Council 
(the Provincial Cabinet which passed the Disciplinary Code as a Regula-
tion to the Police Act). In other words, in view of our guaranteed 
Rights, the provision that a police officer could not be represented by 
professional counsel at a disciplinary hearing was claimed to be exces-
sive from a constitutional standpoint. 
Constable J's counsel argued that her submission was supported by 
section· 7 of the Charter, which provides: 
\' 
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security 
of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamen-
tal justice". 
* Consult Police Disciplinary Code for procedural options. 
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Constable J's life or liberty was not jeopardized by the die'ciplinary 
hearing, but, it was claimed, the security of his person is. •Losing an 
·· .'unblemished record and reputation and other potential losses consequent 
thereon are included within 'security of the person'" argued the 
constable's lawyer. 
The Supreme Court's Chief Justice who considered J's petition held that 
the argument was interesting. However, he concluded that it was not 
necessary to decide whether 'security of the person' should be given the 
broad interpretation suggested by Constable J's counsel or the restric-
ted one that only "a risk of loss of "some personal physical amenity" 
engages the Right. Hence, the Charter was of no assistance. (Section 
10 of the Charter was of no assistance either as the Right to Counsel it 
guarantees only applies to an arrested or detained person). 
The Chief Justice gave his reasons based on the common law concept of 
"fundamental justice" which is "justice and fairness, nothing more and 
nothing less". He said this made it necessary for him to also consider 
if Constable J has an "absolute right to be represented by counsel" 
before a tribunal such as the one which conducts hearings under the 
Disciplinary Code. 
Many of the cases reviewed by the Court were dealing with a variety of 
tribunals. Some had jurisdiction .over licences prerequisite to practis-
ing a certain occupation or profitable activity; another was a "domestic 
tribunal" (in-house association trial committee) and others had juris-
diction over disciplinary proceedings in "disciplined forces" such as 
police and armed services. All of these tribunals had power to affect 
the livelihood and reputation of the persons they try. Precedents seem 
to have created categories of tribunals which are distinct from one 
another in relation to the question put here. Courts have been inclined 
to hold that a person has a right to professional counsel if the tribu-
nal has jurisdiction to impose anything that is adverse to his reputa-
tion or livelihood, but has not been inclined to do so where the tribu-
nal is one having jurisdiction within a disciplined force. In any 
event, the common law does not seem to provide an absolute right to 
counsel at a disciplinary hearing. 
In recently decided cases, there is an obvious departure from this 
thinking. Regardless of ·provisions in disciplinary regulations or the 
R.C.M.P. Act, courts have held that members of disciplined forces have a 
comaon law right to be represented by professional counsel. In the 
Discipline Code applicable to the Calgary Police Service, accused 
members were, according to regulations, only entitled to be represented 
by counsel before the Law Enforcement Appeal Board but not vhen tried by 
a hearing officer. Recognizing that the right to counsel before quasi 
judicial tribuntls is "not yet" absolute, the Alberta Supreme Court held 
in 19741 that .the procedures to be followed were similar to Court 
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procedures and the charges were serious and could affect reputation and 
livelihood. Therefore it was essential to fairness that the officers 
"should have trained and independent representation". In the circum-
stances, denial would be akin to denying natural justice said the Court. 
In 1981 the Federal Court dealt with a similar issue arising from 
Service Court procedures established under the R.C.M.P. Act2. Two 
members charged with "major service offences" had been denied represen-
tation by professional counsel. The penalties provided ranged from a 
reprimand to one year in jail with some fairly severe ones in between. 
Yet the regulations under the R.C.M.P. Act did specifically provide that 
accused members are not entitled to professional counsel (at best they 
may be represented or assisted by another member). Finding the argu-
ments advanced by counsel for the Force "nothing short of ludicrous" and 
concluding that Parliament (when enacting the R.C.M.P. Act) could not 
have intended the Federal Cabinet to make regulations that would deprive 
members of the Force of a basic right to counsel, the Federal Court held 
that the regulations prohibiting legal representation in the Service 
Court were excessive. Therefore, that regulatory provision was found to 
be "ultra vires and of no effect, at least in so far a8 a trial for a 
major service offence under the Act is concerned". 
This left the Chief Justice of the B. C. Supreme Court to decide from 
what direction to approach Cons table J's petition. Should he consider 
the vires of Regulation 18(2) of the Police Discipline Code (whether the 
regulation was excessive and therefore not within the jurisdiction of 
the Provincial Cabinet to make) or should this case be decided on its 
specific circumstances? The Court decided to only do the former and 
concluded that if right thinking citizens would objectively conclude 
that Constable J, who stood to lose one day's pay and have the convic-
tion noted in his personnel record, could fairly be denied counsel at 
the hearing, then the regulation would be valid. Being in agreement 
that this was the appropriate test, counsel, opposing Constable J's 
petition, urged that denying counsel "in cases which are not serious" is 
fair. 
The Court responded that only disciplinary cases conducted formally on a 
"man to man" basis where no entry is made in an officer's record, will 
belong to that "not so serious" category. Said the Chief Justice: 
"In today's society, where career decisions must be 
made at an early age, and many of our citizens do not 
have a second chance and where all policemen are 
assumed to be career off ice rs, and where good conduct 
is obviously an important factor in promition and 
1 Bachinsky and Cantelon v. Sawyer [1974) 1 W.W.R. 295 
2 Re Husted and Ridley and The queen (1981) 58 c.c.c. (2d) 156 
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therefore in salary, and where pension and other bene-
fits depend in part upon salary in the closing years 
of a career, it is clearly untenable to argue that a 
recorded conviction for a disciplinary default • • • 
even for using one naughty participle • • • is not 
serious". 
The Supreme Court obviously considered all complaints which result in 
formal hearings and notations on personnel records per~ serious. 
The Court 
(a) declined to "indulge in an exercise of classification to deter-
mine what is serious and what is not .. ; 
( b) rejected the .. disciplined force.. exception to the right to 
counsel because a police officer has as much right to protection 
of livelihood as persons in any other career or occupation; and 
(c) refused to accept and labelled as an anachronism the proposition 
that there is a .. national contractual acceptance" of unfair 
disciplinary procedures when joining a military or semi military 
force. 
Apparently it was also suggested to the Court that police officers were 
sufficiently familiar with criminal procedures and the law of evidence 
that they could effectively act on their own behalf when charged with a 
"not so serious" disciplinary default. The Court rejected also this 
suggestion and said that even in respect to a lawyer who defends him-
self, it is a .. powerful wisdom" to say that be has a fool for a lawyer 
and a fool for a client. 
Stopping short of saying that Constable J had an absolute right to be 
represented by counsel the Supreme Court concluded that a denial of 
Counsel in these circumstances amounts to a breach of the principles of 
justice and that by creating s. 18(2) of the Police Discipline Cod~ the 
Cabinet (Lieutenant Governor in Council) had exceeded its authority. 
Accordingly, the section is ultra vires and of no force or effect. 
Constable J's petition was granted, and the Chief Justice did prohibit 
the bearing officer or any other hearing officer from proceeding with 
the charge "unless the Petitioner is allowed to be represented by 
counsel, if he wishes". 
* * * * * 
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CUATlllG A DISmuABCE - SllOUTlllG OBSCENITIES AT POLICE 
Mysak v. R. [1982) 6 W.W.R. 563 
Saskatchewan Queen's Bench 
Although decisions by Courts of other provinces are not binding on 
B. c. Courts, the Justice in this case relied on a recent decision by 
the B. C. Court of Appeal*. 
The accused was a passenger in a pick-up truck occupied by three men. A 
police officer pulled the truck over and gave the driver a roadside test 
which he passed. During the test and again at the conclusion of it, the 
accused wanted to talk to the constable about an incident that occurred 
a few days earlier involving the accused's father. When the constable 
refused to discuss the matter, the accused became very angry and 
shouted: "You' re not even a cop. You' re nothing but a fucking pig". 
This assessment of the officer was shouted several times along with 
other uncomplimentary remarks which could be considered obscene in 
certain circles. 
The scene occurred at 1: 30 with no one around other than the accused's 
two companions who testified not to have heard the utterings. In any 
event, they were not affected or disturbed. 
At trial, the Crown proved all elements to the offence and the Judge 
convicted the accused holding that the words, "fucking pig" were 
offending. The accused appealed. 
The evidence showed that the constable was affected in that it had 
disturbed his emotional peace. However, that was not enough; "without 
more" than shouting alleged obscenities there was no disturbance 
caused. This made it unnecessary to determine if the words spoken are 
in fact obscene. 
The Court did not appear to reject the claim that no disturbance was 
caused on the basis that the person affected was a peace officer. 
Appeal allowed 
Conviction quashed 
Comnent: The judicial opinion is somewhat vague on some of the issues 
involved in this question. Basically, what the Courts have struggled 
* R. v. Peters [1982) 2 w.w.R. 520 
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with, particularly in marginal cases, is whether the disturban(:e has to 
have the nature of a public disturbance. The courts are, no doubt, 
reluctant to hold that one disturbed citizen is adequate to render 
another citizen criminally liable. An orthodox pastor may walk by a 
road construction site and overhear an unsavory comment; is the 
construction worker now criminally liable because the pastor is 
disturbed? Should utterances directed at one person only in a public 
place be adequate to legally find that they caused a disturbance because 
the addressee was affected by what was said? Must the perpetrator of 
this crime randomly have done the things mentioned in the section and 
thereby disturbed the public? In other words, must the disturbance be a 
public disturbance? 
Holding that the section only prohibits a public disturbance from being 
caused may well go beyond the protective intent of the section; giving 
it an interpretation that evidence of a disturbed citizen is adequate to 
convict, is also an intollerable extreme. What would have been an 
interesting question in this case too, is whether the language used is 
obscene. 
The Justice did recognize the conflicting interpretations of this 
section and saw the distinction as follows: 
"All that the section requires is that one of the 
acts specified in the section, that is, fighting, 
swearing, etc. be done in circumstances where it 
disturbed a person or where such disturbance might 
be inferred. 
The other view is that the section requires that 
the specified acts, i.e., fighting, swearing, etc. 
must cause a disturbance and it must be in the 
nature of a disturbance itself." 
* * * * * 
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DllIVING CND. A SOLID LIRE DIVIDING A LAllB 
ARD THE PAVED SHOULDER. OF A :ROAD. 
R. v. Argast Vancouver County Court Vancouver Registry No. CC820097 
The accused, riding a motorcycle, passed a line of traffic in the lane 
nearest the shoulder of the road by crossing a single solid line 
dividing the travelled lane and the paved shoulder of the road. In 
other words, he passed on the right by driving on the shoulder of the 
road. The accused was charged with disobeying a traffic control device 
under section 130 of the B. c. Motor Vehicle Act. A Justice of the 
Peace convicted the accused but he appealed claiming that the passing by 
crossing the single solid line that divides the shoulder of the road 
from a travelled lane is not against the law. 
On appeal, the Vancouver County Court held that the combination of the 
definition of 'roadway' and that of 'traffic control device' coupled 
with section 130 M. V .A. does not lead to finding that the accused com-
mitted an offence. In essence, the Court found that the law was clear 
on single solid lines which divide lanes of a highway. The single solid 
line the accused crossed marked the boundary of the roadway but was not 
dividing two roadway lanes designated for traffic travelling in the same 
direction. The Court found no section that specifically prohibits the 
driving over a solid line that divides the shoulder of a roadway from 
the travelled portion. As a matter of fact, there is no mention of such 
a line (traffic control device) 
Accused's appeal allowed 
Verdict of 'not guilty' recorded. 
* * * * * 
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SJWtCB AKO SEIZUKE OF llOREY - IllTEREST OF ltEVDUE CAJUN. 
Slainberg v. Sgt. B. (R.C.M.P.) Supreme Court of B. C. December 10, 
1982 Kamloops Registry No. 6659 
R. C. M. Police Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence of 
Mr. L. upon reasonable and probable grounds for believing that • • 
"unregistered restricted firearms are unlawfully being kept contrary to 
s. 89(1) Criminal Code of Canada ••• ". The warrant was executed and 
besides Mr. L's residence, outbuildings on his property were also 
searched. These buildings, however, were used by Mr. L's tenant, Mr. 
Steinberg (the petitioner) who lived on the property in a converted 
schoolbus. Mr. L. was present during the search but Mr. Steinberg was 
not home at the time. 
No firearms were discovered, but in a grain bin, in a building used by 
Mr. Steinberg $2,600 in U. S. traveller's cheques and $16,200 in cash 
were found. Police took the cheques and the money and when Steinberg 
claimed it back it was refused although no charges were laid. 
The Police at first suspected that the funds were the proceeds of the 
crime of cultivating and trafficking in marihuana. Paraphernalia 
believed to be used in cultivating the narcotic had been found. As no 
evidence was found to connect the funds with any crime, Revenue Canada 
was alerted and they commenced an investigation. Steinberg had reported 
an annual income of + $4, 000 for the last three years and the tax 
department ordered that the funds not be returned to Steinberg until 
they had completed a 'jeopardy assessment' as provided under the "Income 
Tax Act". Steinberg's counsel could not receive any satisfaction as to 
the intentions of the tax people. 
Mr. Steinberg then petitioned the Supreme Court to quash the search 
warrant and to order that the money taken on the strength of it be 
returned to him. 
The tax dispute between Mr. Steinberg and the Federal Crown is, of 
course, not within the Provincial Supreme Court's jurisdiction but 
within that of the Federal Court. The tax department filed a certificate 
in the Federal Court which, by reason of the Income Tax Act, has the 
aame force as a judgment of that Court. Steinberger was, according to 
this document, assessed $21,000 and Sgt. B was, as a third party, 
ordered to turn the funds he held over to Revenue Canada as a part 
payment towards 
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the taxes owed. The latter is authorized by the Income Tax Act which 
provides that the Minister may order a person who is or is about to 
become indebted to someone who owes taxes, to pay the Receiver General 
the amount instead of the tax debtor. Sgt. B. was now confronted with 
conflicting claims, one by Revenue Canada and on the other by Steinberg, 
and he sought relief by way of interpleader as provided for under the 
Supreme Court Rules. After all, Sgt. B. had personally no interest in 
the dispute between Steinberg and Revenue Canada. 
Since Steinberg petitioned the Supreme Court, a number of things 
accurred which changed the legal picture from what it was at the time he 
filed. An adjournment was granted to enable the lawyer for Sgt. B. to 
collect all relevant facts as the notice of hearing was served on B. 
only two days before the hearing. Revenue Canada had used this period 
to "invent or perfect some new legal position" by filing the certificate 
in the Federal Court and serving Sgt. B. with the order. This, the 
Supreme Court Justice said, was "an abuse of court process". The 
adjournment was granted for a different purpose. "No court will 
tolerate such misuse of an adjournment". Therefore, whatever the 
'revenuers' manipulated in the meantime was ignored and Steinberg's 
position was considered in respect to its standing when he filed the 
petition. 
The Court found that at the conclusion of the investigation to determine 
if the funds were the proceeds of cultivating marihuana, the money was 
the property of Steinberg and it should have been returned to him 
forthwith. From that time on, the R. C. M. Police had no claim to the 
money under any pretext and held it illegally. On the day Sgt. B. was 
served with the. Federal Court order, he had the money without any colour 
of right and it should have been then in the hands of its rightful 
owner, Mr. Steinberg. Therefore, the order had no effect. 
When police seize money, they may advise Revenue Canada, but that does 
not confer any authority not to return it to its owner. His right to 
ownership supercedes at that stage the interest of the tax people. 
If Revenue Canada advises the police to retain the money, they counsel 
an unlawful detention of property and may also be subject to liability. 
Money was ordered to be returned to 
Mr. Steinberg. 
Note: In the reasons for judgement the Supreme Court Justice quoted 
1rOiii a we~l-known Manitoba case* which addresses itself generally to the 
111 
* Welch v. Gilmour and Blackstock [1955) c.c.c. 221 
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police being the conscience of a J>ri&oner or the arbitrators in his 
personal indebtedness. 
"Police have no right to seize money found on a 
prisoner where there is no ground for believing 
that it was connected with the offence charged. 
Such money must be returned directly to a prisoner 
and cannot be the subject matter of garnishment 
proceedings". 
* * * * * 
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ADEQUACY OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION REPOKT 
The Queen and Senft Supreme Court of B. C. December 14, 1982 Prince 
George Registry No. 133/82. 
In 1975, a police constable issued a Traffic Violation Report to a 
person! for speeding. The officer wrote to describe the violation: 
"Violation - Section 140(3) Speed - 50. 
Legal speed - 40. Conditions at time of violation 
- speeding." 
The B. c. Supreme Court found this to be an inadequate description of 
the violation. 
Recently a constable wrote on the Traffic Violation Report he issued 
Mr. Senft: 
"Section 150(3) Speeding". 
The Judge who heard the case dismissed the allegation as the Report was 
insufficient in describing the violation. The Court had done so on 
account of the precedent given above. 
The Crown appealed claiming that the precedent has been negated by 
rulings of the Supreme Court of Canada2 that make it plain 
••• that objections to indictments, and other 
initiating process, which are based on 
technicalities as opposed to defects of substance, 
can no longer prevail" 
The B. C. Supreme Court Justice agreed with the Crown's submission and 
held: 
• • • I conclude that the objection taken is not 
one of substance, but relates only to form". 
Finding that it was clear that it was alleged that the accused drove at 
a higher speed than what was permitted by law, the description of the 
violation was sufficient. 
1 R. v. Boyer (Vancouver Registry No. 0064/75 August 29, 1975) 
2 R. v. Cote (1977) 33 c.c.c. (2d) 353 
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (1978) 3 C.R. (3rd) 30. 
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ARSOH - CillaJMSTAllTIAL BVIDERCE - SDIILAJl PACr DI.DEllCE 
'The Queen v. Whittaker - The County Court of Vancouver - December 1982. 
No. CC821382 Vancouver Registry 
. 
The accused lived in an apartment building. On the day of the alleged 
offence (arson)., the accused alerted his landlady of a fire in a hallway 
around the entrance door of a recreation room. The accused had used the 
fire extinguisher to put it out. After all the excitement was over the 
accused went to a bar and was followed by police who found him back 
again at the scene of the fire examining the extinguisher. 
The accused gave versions of his involvement to the landlady, an 
insurance adjuster the police and in testimony to the Court. They were 
to tally inconsistent with one another and found not worthy of belief 
and rejected by the Court as 'not being credible' and complete 
fabrications. 
The Crown sought a conviction based on circumstantial evidence comprised 
mostly of similar fact evidence of arson fires in which the accused was 
involved and the false statements made by the accused. 
It is only natural for police .to concentrate on persons they know to be 
predispositioned to commit the crime that is under investigation. 
Particularly were the belief for such predisposition is based on 
previous convictions for similar offences. 
However, ·no number of similar offences can connect a particular person 
with a particular crime ••• ". Therefore, before similar fact evidence 
is admissible, it must be shown to be relevant and have some probative 
value. It simply cannot be admitted to show bad character on the part 
of the accused and/or that because of previous similar acts he is likely 
to have committed the offence for which he is tried. The prejudice 
created by admission of such evidence without such relevance or value 
would by far outweigh its evidentiary value. 
Then what can it be used for? The Courts have permitted it in evidence 
where the evidence ••• 
••• •may be so relevant if it bears upon the 
question whether the acts alleged to constitute the 
crime charged in the indictment were designed or 
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accidental, or to rebut a defence which would 
otherwise be open to the accused" or for "other 
relevant, probative purpose ••• ". 
In other words, if there is nothing to connect the accused with the 
crime charged other than evidence of bad character and of having commit-
ted similar crimes. before, the similar fact evidence must be rejected. 
The Court gave an example of the use of similar fact evidence. If in a 
rape case the perpetrator had, during the act, done something bizarre in 
the circumstances such as reciting a poem, for instance, then, if he had 
done this before while having sexual intercourse and if the issue is one 
of identity, the similar fact evidence of that unusual behaviour is 
admissible. Of course the purpose is not to show that he raped before 
but to prove his habit of reciting poetry while having sexual inter-
course. 
In this case, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the Crown shows 
either remarkable coincidences of the accused's presence at mysterious 
fires or it proved that the accused has a severe problem and suffers of 
pyromania. The Crown showed that within 8 months several fires broke 
out in the immediate presence of the accused. 
1. A fire broke out in a large garbage container in a basement room of 
the apartment building in which the accused resided. Despite the 
early morning hour, the accused was at the scene advising on the 
sprinkler system. 
2. A few weeks later, the fire occurred which is subject to the charge 
of arson against the accused. Besides the accused's involvement 
outlined above, the police who followed him from the bar to the 
apartment block lost sight of him for a few minutes. During these 
minutes a fire was started in a breezeway between two buildings. 
The location was in the path of the accused. Although the accused's 
connection is tenuous, the evidence has some weight. 
3. Approximately one week later a car was deliberately set on fire in 
the underground garage of the accused's apartment building. Again, 
he was at the scene. 
4. Two months later, and two weeks after the accused moved into another 
apartment building, a car was deliberately set on fire in the under-
ground parking lot. The accused who shared his new apartment with a 
girl friend was, according to the friend, completely dressed when he 
awakened her to evacuate the apartment. The car that was burned was 
known to the accused as he received a ride in it the previous day; 
yet he inquired of his friend if she knew anyone who had a car like 
the one thac burned in the underground garage. 
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·5. Two weeks later the accused partied with another girlfriend (the 
fire chief's daughter) in the girl's apartment. He had quite a bit 
to drink and walked the four blocks to his own apartment in the 
early morning hours. After the accused's departure, two vehicles in . 
the underground parking lot were set afire. The girlfriend had 
urged the accused to use a side entrance to leave. She had watched 
out for him but he had not used that exit. While on his way home 
and in the normal path of travel between the two apartment build-
ings, a fire was set to a news paper building, and the sauna area in 
the accused's building went up in smoke. The latter was also deli-
berately set. The accused helped to evacuate the building and 
pulled the fire alarm. In regards to the newspaper building, he 
phoned the fire department to report the fire. 
All this evidence implicates the accused and shows opportunity. This, 
coupled with the accused's false statements, was sufficient to find that 
the burden of proof had been met. However, the Court held that the lies 
must not receive separate consideration and are part of the circum-
stantial evidence. 
··To conclude the accused is simply the victim of a 
hugh set of unhappy coincidences, 'a run of bad 
luck' as the accused puts it, is two shocking to 
common sense to prove an overall rational conclu-
sion contrary to that of guilt ... 
The only rational conclusion was the guilt of the accused. 
* * * * * 
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TIO-BITS 
Bouse Party - Breach of the Peace 
Police attended to a complaint of a noisy and wild house party. They 
were met by abusive language and revolting attitude. A sweep was made 
through the . house and the guests were evicted via the front and back 
door. The accused belonged to the group which exited the rear and was 
forced to continue on his way through a back alley as the officer 
walked four abreast behind them. The accused broke away from the 
group and attempted to return to the house by some other route. An 
officer placed the accused under arrest for breach of the peace. The 
accused responded by means of a vigorous struggle and found himself 
charged with resisting a peace officer in the lawful performance of 
his duty. 
With the greatest of sympathy for the predicaments encountered by 
police when called to these house parties (which no doubt are socio-
logically problematic) the trial judge found that . the arrest was 
unlawful. A breach of the peace is not a mere annoyance or insult to 
an individual. It is the commission of assault, an affray, a matter 
of public alarm or excitement. The Judge went as far as to say that 
any arrest other than those for a specific criminal offence are unlaw-
ful. 
The house party problem was recognized but considered to be one to be 
resolved by the legislators. 
Accused was acquitted. 
R. v. Lefebre 67 c.c.c. (2d) 466. B.C. Provincial Court February 1982 
* * * * * 
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Self Crimination - Charter of Rights 
Section 13 of the Charter of Rights which probably replaces s. 5 
of the Canada Evidence Act states: 
"A witness who testifies in any proceedings 
has the right not to have any incriminating 
evidence so given used to incriminate that 
witness in any other proceedings, except in 
a prosecution for perjury or for the giving 
of contradictory evidence". 
The accused testified at his trial for robbery which ended up in a 
hung jury. The accused was tried again. The Crown applied to adduce 
the accused's testimony during the first trial. This was not 
allowed. When the accused testified at his second trial, the Crown 
wanted to use the transcript of the accused's testimony at the first 
trial for the purpose of cross examination. Based on section 13 of 
the Charter, the Court held that the accused's testimony during the 
first trial could not be used against him in the second trial. 
R. v. Wilson Ontario County Court 67 c.c.c. (2d) 481 
* * * * * 
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Charter of Right - Presumptions of Guilt 
On page 9 of Volume 7 of this publication. you find R. v. Anson which 
is the answer of a B. C. County Court Judge to the question whether 
section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act is in violation of the presump-
tion of innocence under the Charter. (Since then the B. C. Supreme 
Court has refused to intervene in this ruling and in essence advised 
defence counsel to raise the issue in an appeal in the event Anson is 
convicted). In Saskatchewan the validity of section 8 of the Narcotic 
Control Act was also questioned in view of the Charter. during a trial 
for trafficking in marihuana. The Saskatchewan Court of the Queen's 
Bench Justice observed that the wording of the Bill of Rights of 1960 
in regards to the presumption of innocence is very similar to that 
used in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982. The Supreme Court 
of Canada held in 1971* that the statutory presumptions were not 
contrary to the presumtion of innocence but simply cast on the accused 
a burden "to adduce negating evidence that would carry proof on a 
balance of probabilities". This is not an ultimate burden to prove 
his innocence with respect to any element of the offence charged. 
The Saskatchewan Court held that section 8 N.C.A. is reasonable and 
necessary to give law enforcement officers the tools to enforce the 
Act. Without the onus section 8 put on the accused the Crown would be 
in a position which is as impossible to proving a negative or an 
exception. 
"Who better than the party in possession of the 
substance can explain the purpose other by his own 
evidence or the evidence of others"? 
The Court concluded the s. 8 N.C.A. is in full force and effect. 
R. v. Fraser 68 CCC ( 2d) 433 
Queen' s Bench 
June 1982, Saskatchewan Court of 
Note: In Alberta the Supreme Court has also held that statutory 
presumptions in the Criminal Code are not disposed by the Charter of 
Rights. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. Appleby (1971) 3 CCC (2d) 354 
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The accused was charged with impaired driving and the Crown proceeded 
by summary conviction. The accused pleaded not guilty and the case 
was adjourned and adjourned and etc. • • Finally, eight aonths later 
the Crown and defence were all set for trial. However, the provincial 
court judge dismissed the case without hearing evidence or considering 
any submissions. The Judge gave as a reason not being aware that the 
accused had consented to all the adjournments and, therefore, he felt 
he had lost jurisdiction over the case. 
Considering this to be legal balderdash, the Crown proceeded with a 
new information but was forced to proceed by indictment as the six 
months' limit for proceeding by summary conviction had expired. The 
accused pleaded autrefois acquit. The validity of the plea that he 
could not be charged with the very offence of which he was acquitted 
previously became an issue. The Court of Appeal said the erroneous 
reason for which the trial judge dismissed the first information 
invalidated the acquittal and, therefore, the plea of autrefois acquit 
was not available to the accused. The Supreme Court of Canada 
reversed that decision and said that whether or not the trial judge 
was wrong, the acquittal prevented the Crown from relaying the charge. 
If the Crown had wanted a remedy to the judicial error, it should have 
appealed the dismissal rather than proceeding with a new information. 
(Petersen v. The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, September 28, 1982.) 
* * * * * 
